Wyoming Law Journal
Volume 12

Number 2

Article 11

December 2019

The Judicial Fate of Legislative Attempts to Maintain School
Segregation
Samuel A. Anderson

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlj

Recommended Citation
Samuel A. Anderson, The Judicial Fate of Legislative Attempts to Maintain School Segregation, 12 WYO.
L.J. 124 (1958)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlj/vol12/iss2/11

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Wyoming Law Journal by an authorized editor of Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship.

WYOMING LAW JOURNAL

will, or other instrument does not describe them as husband and
refer to their marital relationship. The court continued by ruling
conveyance by the husband and wife jointly passed title to the
free and clear of any claims of creditors of the husband. This
indicates that a judgment creditor of either spouse cannot render
defective, or defeat the right to convey entirety property.

wife, or
that the
property
decision
the title

The dilemma facing a creditor who has a debt or a judgment secured
against only one spouse is now very significant. A caveat to future creditors: demand the signatures of both spouses as obligees on any and all
transactions, because a judgment against just one spouse will not subject
the entirety property or its proceeds to the satisfaction of the judgment.
To protect oneself from the above mentioned pitfalls, one must always
keep in mind the full effect of the incidents of an estate by the entirety
in day to day transactions involving real estate in Wyoming.
Roy R.

PETSCH

THE JUDICIAL FATE OF LEGISLATIVE ATTEMPTS TO
MAINTAIN SCHOOL SEGREGATION
In the three years since the Supreme Court of the United States announced in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka' (popularly entitled
the "School Segregation Case") that separate public school facilities for
the white and Negro races were inherently unequal and that the schools
must be integrated, there has been, in the south especially, a rash of
legislation aimed at delaying or defeating completely the integrative
process. Some of this legislation has been examined in the courts of the
United States in an effort to test its constitutionality in light of the Brown
decision. It is the purpose of this note to present the results of such examinations.
Before entering upon a discussion of the judicial results of legislative
attempts to evade the school segregation case it will be well to examine
briefly our present situation through the translucent pane of history.
In 1896 the Supreme Court of the United States announced in the
case of Plessy v. Ferguson2 the "separate but equal" doctrine. Under this
doctrine segregation on the basis of race alone was constitutional so long
as the facilities provided for one race were substantially equal to the
facilities provided for the other. Even as it was articulated, however, the
doctrine of separate but equal began to lose ground. In the same case,
Mr. Justice Harlan's dissent sounded the depths of the majority decision
and found it wanting. He pointed out that it was unfortunate that the
nation's highest tribunal should conclude that it was competent for a
1.
2.

347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873, 38 A.L.R.2d 1180 (1954).
163 U.S. 537, 16 S.Ct. 1138, 41 L.Ed. 256 (1896).
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state to regulate the enjoyment of civil rights solely on the basis of race.
He accurately prophesied that the decision would stimulate state enactments devised to defeat the constitutional amendments resulting from the
civil war and keep alive a conflict of the races.3 In the opinion of Mr.
Harland, the Plessy decision would, in time, prove as pernicious as the
4
decision made by the Supreme Court in the Dred Scott case.
Mr. Justice Harlan's prophecy was vindicated in that the decisions
subsequent to Plessy v. Ferguson all too often held a showing of "nominal
equality" to be sufficient to satisfy the separate but equal doctrine5 ;
however, as the pressure for school desegregation mounted, many courts
began to require, to satisfy the doctrine, "real equality." 6 The real equality
test, articulated in cases involving colleges and universities first, came to
be applied for the benefit of the public schools as well. This meant that
the buildings, facilities, curricula and busses furnished the Negro race
had to be equal in quality and convenience to those furnished the white
7
children.
The long life of the separate but equal doctrine came to an ignominious end in 1954. The United States Supreme Court, as a result of
a continued clamor of appeals from lower courts, announced in the Brown
case that separate facilities were inherently unequal and that segregation
solely on the basis of race was violative of the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. In a second hearing for the purpose of
formulating a decree it placed the burden of solving problems raised by
the integration decision on the local school boards.8 In the same decision,
federal district courts were directed "to take proceedings and enter such
orders and decrees . . . as are necessary and proper to admit (colored
children) to public schools on a racially non-discriminatory basis with all
deliberate speed," 9 and were further charged with the responsibility of
determining whether the action of the school authorities constitutes "good
faith implementation of governing constitutional principles," 10 taking into
consideration the circumstances of each case.
The reaction to the decision of the Brown case was varied. Immediately several states announced their intention to abide by the ruling."1
3.
4.

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Id. at 1147.
Id. at 1146.

Dameron v. Bayless, 14 Ariz. 180, 126 Pac. 273 (1912); Williams v. Zimmerman, 172

Md. 563, 192 Atl. 353 (1938).
Missouri v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 59 S.Ct. 232, 83 L.Ed. 208 (1938).
Davis v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, 103 F.Supp. 337 (E.D.
Va. 1952).
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 349 U.S. 294, 75 S.Ct. 753, 99 L.Ed. 1083

(1955).

Id. at 301.
Id. at 299.
Delaware (Attorney General announced separate but equal provision of state
constitution no longer binding), Kentucky (Governor stated that Kentucky would
do whatever necessary to abide by law), Maryland (Governor stated that Maryland
would accept Supreme Court's interpretation of Constitution), Missouri (Attorney
General ruled all constitutional and statutory requirements for segregation void).
Oklahoma, Texas, West Virginia, and the District of Columbia also announced
their intentions to follow the ruling.
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Others, from the first, opposed the ruling. 12 In these latter states, in the
three years following the Brown case, a number of constitutional amendments and statutory enactments have appeared, apparently aimed at maintaining segregation in the public schools.
It is beyond the scope of this note to examine every constitutional
amendment and statutory enactment passed by legislatures motivated
to maintain segregation of the races in spite of the Brown decision. Some
of the more typical amendments and enactments, in effect, are as follows:
Expense grants to pupils desiring to attend conveniently located private
nonsectarian schools generally accompanied by the granting of local options to school districts to suspend operation of public schools, and also
accompanied by compulsory school attendance law amendments to provide
that in the event white and Negro children are integrated a dissatisfied
parent would not have to send his child to that school, 13 pupil assignment
or placement acts,' 4 and continued segreation under an amendment expressly providing that it is continued as a result of the exercise of the
states police power.15 Gerrymandering of school districts has been attempted by local school board resolution.' 6
Of the many legislative attempts to defeat the school segregation case
comparatively few have reached the federal courts. The fact that so few
enactments have been challenged in the federal court system may be mute
testimony of their effectiveness; however, in all probability many of the
statutes that have become law have become such despite a foreknowledge
on the part of the responsible assemblies and legislatures that the acts
would ultimately be declared unconstitutional in the light of the Brown
case or for other reasons. Why then was much of this legislation given
birth? It is the considered opinion of at least one legal writer' 7 that
some areas of the nation are fighting a delaying action and that the
new laws, many of which are accompanied by complex administrative
remedies,' 8 are designed to delay indefinitely any judicial determination
of non-compliance with the Brown case. It is a rule of administrative law
that a complainant must exhaust all state administrative remedies before
a federal court will enjoin state administrative action. 19 The Supreme
Court has not considered the exhaustion rule as it is related to segregation
cases; however, it did deny certiorari in one case where the Negro complainants appealed a court of appeals holding that Negroes must exhaust
administrative remedies by individually applying for admission to the
white schools as required by the North Carolina statute before they would
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi and South Carolina.
E.g., N.C. Const., Art. IX, § 12; N.C. Laws § 3-5 (E.S. 1956).
Va. Code §§ 22-232.1 - 22-232.16 (Supp. 1956).
La. Const., Art. XII, § 1 as amended by Act 752 of 1954; La. Acts § 555-1 (1954).
Clemmons v. Board of Education of Hillsboro, Ohio, 228 F.2d 853 (6th Cir. 1956).
E.g., Abzug, Legislative Proposals in the South Against Integration, 16 Lawyers
Guild Rev. 83 (1956).
E.g., Ala. Acts § 201-7-9 1955); La. Acts § 556-1 (1954).
Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 29 S.Ct. 67, 53 L.Ed. 150 (1908).
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be entitled to a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief in a federal
court with respect to their right to attend school. 20
To date there have reached the federal court system three cases construing certain legislative provisions which have had the effect of continuing segregation in the public schools2 1 and one construing a local school
boards attempted gerrymandering of a school district. 22 First consideration
will be given the gerrymander case of Clemons v. Board of Education of
Hillsboro, Ohio.2 3

In that case the Negro complainants sought to enjoin

the defendants from enforcing a policy of racial segregation in the public
schools by requiring the complainants to withdraw from previously all
white schools and enroll in an all Negro school. The complainants were
registered in the fall in the two previously all white schools and assigned
seats in the classrooms. Six days after registration, the board of education,
for the first time in its history, set up a school zoning system. The resolution divided the city into three school zones, one for each of the city's
three elementary schools. The Negro school zone was divided into two
completely separated parts, one in the north and one in the south of the
city. Three of the complainants who lived in the south section of the
Negro zone had to pass by one of the white schools in order to reach the
Negro school. The colored school was not even in the colored zone,
but was located in one of the white zones. The defendant board based its
gerrymander action on the overcrowded conditions in the white schools.
The district court, although holding the establishment of the system to be
a subterfuge to segregate children who had been admitted to the white
school, denied the relief prayed for upon the ground that it would seriously disrupt the orderly procedure of the white schools. It felt that the
board's exercise of discretionary powers should not be interfered with.
Granting the injunction, the circuit court held the lower court's conclusion to be "clearly erroneous" and said that under the holding in the
second Brown case 2 4 the board abused its discretion in establishing the
zoning ordinance and assigning the complainants to segregated schools, and
that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to enjoin the
board's violation.
The first of two Louisiana cases, Orleans Parish School Board v.
Bush,25 involved a suit by Negro pupils against the parish school board
and others for a declaratory judgment that the state constitutional provision and certain statutes 26 designed to maintain public school segregation
20.
21.

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Carson v. Warlick, 238 F.2d 724 (4th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 910.
Adkins v. School Board of Newport News, 148 F.Supp. 430 (E.D. Va. 1957) ; Ludley
v. Board of Supervisors of L.S.U., 150 F.Supp. 900 (E.D. La. 1957); Orleans Parish
School Board v. Bush, 242 F.2d 156 (5th Cir. 1957), motion to file writ of mandamus

denied, 351 U.S. 948, cert. denied, 354 U.S. 921.
Clemons v. Board of Education of Hillsboro, Ohio, 228 F.2d 853 (6th Cir. 1956).
228 F.2d 853 (6th Cir. 1956).
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 349 U.S. 294, 75 S.Ct. 753, 99 L.Ed. 1083
(1955).
242 F.2d 156 (5th Cir. 1957).
La. Const., Art XII, § 1 as amended by Act 752 of 1954; La. Acts §§ 555, 556 (1954).
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were invalid, and for an injunction against the action of the defendants
which required and permitted segregation. Subsequent to the decision in
the Brown case, Louisiana adopted an amendment to its constitution,
which already provided for segregation of white and Negro children in
the public schools, by adding that:
".. . This provision is made in the exercise of the state police
power to promote and protect public health, morals, better education and the peace and good order of the state, and not because
enact laws to enforce the state
of race. The legislature shall
27
police power in this respect."
The legislature then enacted statutes providing for the assignment of each
pupil each year by the parish superintendent without providing any
standards for the assignments other than the superintendent's discretion.28
The same legislature provided for the imposition of penalties on local
boards and individuals failing to observe the statutory requirements for
the maintenance of segregated schools. 29 The court of appealsO held that
the constitutional provision and the implementing statutes were unconstitutional as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. As to the constitutional provision the court recognized that
"the use of the term police power works no magic in itself." 3' 1 It went
on to say that although the police power of the state is broad, it is limited
by the Federal Constitution.32 As to the Pupil Assignment Law, the
court said that whatever might be the holding as to the validity of such
a law if it contained reasonable standards to guide officials, where the
statute provided no standards to aid the superintendent of the local school
board in the exercise of his discretion, it was unconstitutional. 33 Such
a statute is unconstitutional, the court said, either because on its face it
has the effect of depriving Negro children of their liberty or property
without due process of law, or because it has implied as its only basis
4
for pupil assignments the prohibited standard of race.
5
In Ludley v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University,8
several Negro plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment and injunction
against the University Board of Supervisors and the Louisiana State Board
of Education to determine the constitutionality of certain statutes by

27.
28.
29
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Note 26 supra.
La. Acts § 556-1 (1954).
.La. Acts § 555-4 (1954).
Orleans Parish School Board v. Bush, 242 F.2d 156 (5th Cir. 1957).
Id. at 163.
Id. at 164.
Id. at 164.
Id. at 164. Statutes and ordinances which do not prescribe rules, conditions and
standards for the guidance of administrative officials are considered as violative
of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The reason for the rule
is expressed in the following language: ". .. For the very idea that one man may
be compelled to hold his life, or the means of living, or any material right essential
to the enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another, seems to be intolerable in any
country where freedom prevails, as being the essence of slavery itself." Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886).
35. 150 F.Supp. 900 (E.D. La. 1957).
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which the legislature attempted to maintain segregation in Louisiana educational institutions.3 6 One statute required, as a prerequisite to attending state institutions of higher learning, a certificate of elegibility and good
moral character signed by the student's former principal and superintendent.3 7 The same legislature provided, in effect, that the jobs of
principals and superintendents who signed the certificates would be in
jeopardy.38 The court held that the statutes were unconstitutional as a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
when taken in pari materia with other statutes and that the statute requiring a certificate was unconstitutional even when taken alone because
the obvious intent of the legislature was to discriminate against the Negro.
The court said that this attempt, while more subtle-than its predecessor,
construed in the Bush case supra,3 9 still must fail since the Fourteenth
Amendment "nullifies sophisticated as well as simple minded modes of
40
discrimination."
In the Virginia case of Adkins v. School Board of the City of Newport
News 4 1 the Negro plantiffs sought to enjoin the defendant from any
practices, customs or usages in segregating students in the public schools.
42
In 1956 the Virginia legislature passed the Virginia Pupil Placement Act
which provided for assignment by a pupil placement board of pupils to
schools in consideration of such factors as the effect of enrollment on the
best interests of the child and other children in the school, as well as the
effect on the efficiency of the operation of said school, the sociological,
psychological, and like intangible social scientific factors and such other
matters as might have been deemed pertinent to the efficient operation
of the schools. The act made provision for an administrative remedy
whereby 105 days would elapse from the time a party aggrieved by a decision
of the pupil placement board would file protest and the final decision by
the governor. 43 The same legislature amended and re-enacted the Appropriations Act 44 so as to substantially cut off all funds for school appropriation at the state level for any class of schools in the entire locality, in
the event any one school should be integrated. The court held that notwithstanding the fact that legislation carries a presumption of constitutionality and despite the fact that it makes no mention of white or colored
school children, in light of the legislative intent as expressed by the
36.
37.
38.

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

La. Acts § 555 (1954); La. Acts § 249 (1956); La. Acts § 15 (1956).
La. Acts § 15 (1956).
La. Acts § 249 (1956): "A permanent teacher shall not be removed from office
except upon written and signed charges of willful neglect of duty, or incompetency
or dishonesty, or of being a member of or contributing to any group, organization,
movement or corporation that is by law prohibited from operating in the State of
Louisiana, or of advocating or in any manner performing any act toward bringing
about integration of the races within the public school system or any higher
institution of learning of the State of Louisiana. .. "
Orleans Parish School Board v. Bush, 242 F.2d 156 (5th Cir. 1957).
Ludley v. Board of Supervisors of L.S.U., 150 F.Supp. 900, 901 (E.D. La. 1957).
148 F.Supp. 430 (E.D. Va. 1957).
Va. Code §§ 22-232.1-22-232.16 (Supp. 1956).
Va. Code § 22-232.6 (Supp. 1956).
Va. Acts §§ 71-133, 134, 137, 138 and 143 (E.S. 1956).
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amended Appropriations Act, General Assembly Resolutions 45 and Governors Addresses, 4 6 the Pupil Placement Act was unconstitutional. The
court said the pattern was plain-that the legislature had adopted procedures to defeat the Brown decision. As regards the alleged administrative remedy the court said that before persons would be barred from
federal courts as not having exhausted the administrative remedy, the
administrative remedy must be adequate-that it must be indeed a remedy
and not an administrative block. They then determined the administrative
remedy in this case to be, in fact, a block.
By way of conclusion it can be said that so far the federal courts have
been very decisive in striking down legislative and other attempts to defeat
the Brown decision. Some states will undoubtedly continue to endeavor
to postpone integration by the exercise of every means at their disposal,
including the enactment of statutes. In light of the present unsympathetic
attitude of the federal courts toward such legislative proposals it would
seem that states by passing such laws can hope to accomplish no more than
a delaying of the inevitable. Even the element of delay has been seriously
curtailed by the holding in the Adkins case 47 requiring the administrative
remedy be "adequate" before the complainant is bound to exhaust it as a
prerequisite to federal court jurisdiction.
SAMUEL A. ANDERSON
LEGAL INVESTMENTS FOR A WYOMING TRUSTEE
The use of trusts is presently accelerating with such force that trustees
currently control an estimated 85 billion dollars.' This is sufficient to
indicate that the use of trusts is becoming so prevalent that it may be
considered to be the rule rather than the exception. This article will
scrutinize the laws which control the Wyoming trustee's selection of investments as he fulfills his duty of making the trust funds properly productive.
The first thing the Wyoming trustee must use as a guidepost for his
selection of investments is the Wyoming Constitution. This provides as
follows:
No act of the legislature shall authorize the investment of
trust funds by executors, administrators, guardians,
or trustees,
2
in the bonds or stock of any private corporation.
The Supreme Court of Wyoming has interpreted this constitutional provision as prohibiting the passage of such an act by the legislature as well
as being a specific declaration of policy against a trustee making such an'
investment without court approval. The Court said:
45.
46.
47.

Va. Acts 1956, Senate Joint Resolution No. 3, p. 1213 (Interposition Resolution).
Adkins v. School Board of Newport News, 148 F.Supp. 430 (E.D. Va. 1957).
Ibid.

1.

Report of the New York Joint Legislative Committee on Charitable and Philanthropic Agencies and Organizations 15 (1954).
Wyo. Const., Art. III, § 38.

2.

